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This paper studies the welfare properties of competitive equilibria in an economy with financial frictions
hit by aggregate shocks. In particular, it shows that competitive financial contracts can result in excessive
borrowing ex ante and excessive volatility ex post. Even though, from a first-best perspective the equilibrium
always displays under-borrowing, from a second-best point of view excessive borrowing can arise.
The inefficiency is due to the combination of limited commitment in financial contracts and the fact
that asset prices are determined in a spot market. This generates a pecuniary externality that is not
internalized in private contracts. The model provides a framework to evaluate preventive policies which
can be used during a credit boom to reduce the expected costs of a financial crisis.
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In the past two decades, both developed and emerging economies have experienced episodes
of rapid credit expansion, followed, in some cases, by a ﬁnancial crisis, with a collapse in asset
prices, credit and investment.1 This experience has led policy makers to be increasingly wary of
credit booms and to propose various preventive measures to reduce the probability and/or the
depth of a potential crisis.2 However, relatively little theoretical work has analyzed the reasons
why a credit boom may be ineﬃcient from an ex ante perspective, and whether any intervention
is warranted. If the private sector correctly perceives the risk of a negative aggregate shock,
it will incorporate this risk in its optimal decisions. If agents still decide to borrow heavily
during the boom, it means that the expected gains from increased investment today more than
compensate for the expected costs of ﬁnancial distress in the future. Therefore, to assess the
need for policy intervention, one needs to understand how, and under what conditions, this
private calculation leads to ineﬃcient decisions at the social level. In this paper, I address this
question focusing on a pecuniary externality which arises from the combination of ﬁnancial
constraints with a competitive market for real assets. I analyze constrained eﬃciency by
considering a planner who faces the same constraints faced by the private economy, and asking
whether a reduction in borrowing ex ante can lead to a Pareto improvement. My main result
is that excessive borrowing can arise in equilibrium, and that it is associated to an excessive
contraction in investment and asset prices if the crisis takes place.
The paper develops a three-period model of investment with ﬁnancial frictions. In the ﬁrst
period, entrepreneurs with limited internal funds borrow and invest in some productive asset
(real estate, machinery, equipment, etc.). In the second period, their revenues are subject to
an aggregate shock, which can take two values, good and bad. When the bad shock hits, they
face operational losses. Given their limited access to outside funds, they need to sell part of
the assets to ﬁnance these losses. Assets are sold on a competitive market, where they are
absorbed by a traditional sector, which makes a less productive use of them. Each entrepreneur
has access to state-contingent debt contracts: he can decide both how much to borrow in the
ﬁrst period and how much to repay in diﬀerent states of the world in the following periods.
By investing more in the ﬁrst period the entrepreneur earns higher revenues if the good shock
1For the main stylized facts on boom-bust cycles see Gourinchas, Valdes and Landerretche (2001), Borio and
Lowe (2002), Bordo and Jeanne (2002), Tornell and Westermann (2002), Ranciere, Tornell and Westermann
(2003).
2See Borio (2003) and references therein.
1is realized, but faces larger losses if the bad shock hits. Entrepreneurs are fully rational and
correctly perceive the risks and rewards associated to diﬀerent ﬁnancial decisions. However,
since they are atomistic, they do not take into account the general equilibrium eﬀect of asset
s a l e so np r i c e s . T h i si st h ep e c u n i a r ye x t e r n a l i t ya tt h eb a s i so fm yi n e ﬃciency result. By
reducing aggregate investment ex ante a planner can reduce the size of the asset sales in the
bad state. This increases asset prices, leading to a reallocation of funds from the traditional
sector, who is buying assets, to the entrepreneurial sector, who is selling them. Due to the
presence of ﬁnancial frictions, this reallocation leads to an aggregate welfare gain, which is not
internalized by private agents.
Many accounts of recent ﬁnancial crises have emphasized the interaction between asset
prices and ﬁnancial distress in the corporate and ﬁnancial sector. As an example, take the
case of the banking sector in Thailand prior to the crisis of 1997. In the ﬁr s th a l fo ft h e9 0 s
Thai banks increased their investment in real estate, both directly, through loans to property
developers, and indirectly, through loans to ﬁnance companies which had extensive investment
in real estate. When the crisis erupted, the fall in real estate prices eroded the value of the
assets held by the banks, as loans, backed by real estate guarantees, started going into default.
This prompted a cut-back in lending, which, in turns, led to a further reduction in the demand
for real estate and a further drop in real estate prices. In these circumstances, the large supply
of recently developed real estate, fueled by bank lending during the boom, contributed to the
severe collapse in prices during the crisis.3 This is the type of mechanism I model in this paper.
To capture the essence of the argument, I do not model explicitly ﬁnancial intermediation and
I concentrate on a setup where ﬁnancially constrained agents invest directly in real assets.
Current policy debates mention a number of reasons why a credit boom might be ineﬃcient:
irrational optimism of the borrowers; moral hazard caused by the expectation of a bailout;
ineﬃcient delays in the treatment of information; some negative externality by which higher
borrowing of some agents may increase “systemic risk.” Of these arguments, only the ﬁrst two
have been fully developed in the literature.4 This paper attempts to formalize the “systemic
risk” argument, focusing on a pecuniary externality working through asset prices. The idea
3See Herring and Wachter (1999) for a narrative of the boom-bust cycle in Thailand. See Watanabe (2007)
for an empirical estimate of the eﬀect of losses on real estate investment on banks’ lending in Japan.
4The literature on optimal monetary policy has analyzed economies where an investment boom is driven
by an irrational fad, or “bubble,” see Cecchetti, Genberg, Lipsky and Wadhwani (2000), Bernanke and Gertler
(2001), and Dupor (2002). For the moral hazard argument applied to recent crises, see McKinnon and Pill
(1996), Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini (1999), Tornell and Schneider (2004).
2of focusing on the general equilibrium feed-back between ﬁnancial distress and asset prices
goes back to Shleifer and Vishny (1992) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). The role of asset
“ﬁre sales” during recent episodes of ﬁnancial crisis has been emphasized by Krugman (1998).
Systematic evidence on ﬁre sales is presented in Pulvino (1998) and Aguiar and Gopinath
(2005).
The fundamental source of ineﬃciency in this paper is in ﬁnancial frictions, both on the
borrowers’ (entrepreneurs) and on the lenders’ (consumers) side. In particular, my model
assumes that both entrepreneurs and consumers have limited ability to commit to future
repayments. Lack of commitment on the entrepreneurs’ side implies that they have limited
access to external ﬁnance. Lack of commitment on the consumers’ side limits the entrepreneurs’
ability to insure ex ante against aggregate liquidity shocks, as in Holmstrom and Tirole (1998).
As I will show in Section 4, the combination of these two imperfections drives the ineﬃciency
result.
The paper is related to the large literature on the role of ﬁnancial frictions in the am-
pliﬁcation and propagation of macroeconomic shocks.5 Existing papers have compared the
equilibrium arising in models with ﬁnancial constraints with a ﬁrst-best benchmark in which
no ﬁnancial constraints are present. The main contribution of this paper is to study welfare
from a second-best perspective and to identify the possibility of over-borrowing. The closer
precedent to the model presented is Krishnamurthy (2003), who develops a model à la Kiy-
otaki and Moore (1997) with state-contingent contracts. He uses the model to argue that, in
presence of state-contingent contracts, the degree of ampliﬁcation is smaller than in the case
of non-state-contingent debt.6 Gertler (1992) oﬀers an early analysis of multi-period ﬁnancial
contracts in an environment with agency costs, aggregate shocks, and state-contingent con-
tracts. The analysis of state-contingent debt is also related to the literature on hedging in the
presence of ﬁnancial constraints. In particular, Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993) make the
case that ﬁrms with access to costly external ﬁnance and with a concave technology should
hedge cash-ﬂo ws h o c k s .I nm ym o d e lﬁrms have a constant returns to scale technology. How-
ever, a similar motive for hedging aggregate cash-ﬂow shocks arises in general equilibrium.
5See Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Lamont (1995), Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), Acemoglu and Zilibotti
(1997), Aghion, Banerjee and Piketty (1999), Tornell and Schneider (2003), Rampini (2003), Cooley, Marimon
and Quadrini (2004), Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2007) and references in Bernanke et al. (2001).
6“Fire sales” of assets are not present in his model, i.e. entrepreneurial investment is always positive.
Therefore, my conjecture is that over-borrowing cannot arise in that setup, although the equilibrium is not
constrained eﬃcient.
3Since asset prices drop when aggregate entrepreneurial wealth is low, that increases the rate of
return on investing in the bad state, and induces entrepreneurs to transfer ﬁnancial resources
to that state.
From a methodological standpoint, the idea that the competitive equilibrium in economies
with endogenous borrowing constraints can be constrained ineﬃcient goes back to Kehoe and
Levine (1993). They show that in an economy with limited enforcement the ﬁrst welfare
theorem holds when there is only one good, but fails to hold with more than one good.7 In the
second case, private contracts fail to internalize their eﬀect on equilibrium prices, and, in turns,
these prices aﬀect the ﬁnancial constraints. This paper shows that pecuniary externalities of
this type provide a useful framework to study credit booms. Recent contributions that use
constrained eﬃciency analysis to study the role of preventive policies in ﬁnancial markets
include Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001, 2003), Lorenzoni (2001), Allen and Gale (2004),
Gai, Kondor and Vause (2006), and Farhi, Golosov and Tsyvinski (2007).
A recent paper by Bordo and Jeanne (2002) approaches credit booms from a point of view
similar to the one taken here, focusing on the trade-oﬀ between high investment ex ante and
ﬁnancial distress ex post. They consider an economy with sticky prices and show that, if
the ﬁrms are highly leveraged when a negative shock hits, this causes a sharper reduction
in investment and output. In this environment they study the eﬀect of preventive monetary
policy, which can help to reduces ﬁrms’ leverage ex ante.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I introduce the model. In Section 3,
I characterize the competitive equilibrium. Section 4 contains the welfare analysis and a
discussion of policy implications. Section 5 concludes. All the proofs are in the appendix.
2 The Model
There are three periods, 0,1 and 2, and two groups of agents of equal mass, consumers and
entrepreneurs. There are two goods, a perishable consumption good and a capital good.
Consumption goods can be turned into capital goods one for one at any point in time, but the
opposite is not feasible.
Consumers are risk neutral with preferences represented by the utility function E [c0 + c1 + c2],
and receive a constant endowment e of consumption goods in each period. Entrepreneurs are
7In turns, this result is related to the ineﬃciency result in economies with incomplete markets, Geanakoplos
and Polemarchakis (1986).
4also risk neutral but only consume in period 2. Their preferences are given by E [ce
2].T h e y
b e g i nl i f ew i t ha ne n d o w m e n tn of consumption goods and receive no further endowment in the
following periods. Moreover, they have access to the following technology. In period 0, they
choose the level of investment k0. In period 1, this investment yields ask0 units of consumption
good, with as > 0. The productivity of investment at date 1, as, is random and depends on the
aggregate state s, which takes the values l and h (low and high) with probabilities πl and πh.
In period 1 the capital k0 requires maintenance in order to remain productive. Maintenance
costs are equal to γ units of consumption goods per unit of capital. If γ is not paid, capital is
scrapped, i.e., it fully depreciates. Entrepreneurs choose the fraction of capital they want to
keep productive, denoted by χs ∈ [0,1].H e n c e ,χsk0 is the undepreciated part of the capital
stock and total maintenance costs are equal to γχsk0. At the end of period 1, entrepreneurs
choose the capital stock for next period, k1s, by making the net investment k1s − χsk0.T h e
capital stock k1s produces Ak1s units of consumption goods in period 2, with A>1. Capital
fully depreciates at the end of period 2.
Each consumer owns a ﬁrm in the “traditional sector.” Firms in the traditional sector
invest capital kT
1s in period 1 to produce consumption goods in period 2. The technology of
the traditional sector is represented by the production function F(kT
1s). The function F (.) is
increasing, strictly concave, twice diﬀerentiable, and satisﬁes the following properties: F (0) =




is bounded below, with lower bound q.
The goods and capital markets are competitive. The price of capital in period 1 is denoted
by qs. For simplicity, I assume that the economy begins with no capital, so the price of capital
is one in period 0, as long as some investment takes place. On the other hand, the price of
capital is zero in period 2, since that is the ﬁnal date.
2.1 Financial contracts with limited commitment
At date 0, entrepreneurs oﬀer ﬁnancial contracts to consumers. A ﬁnancial contract speciﬁes
a loan d0 at date 0 from the consumer to the entrepreneur and state-contingent payments d1s
and d2s from the entrepreneur to the consumer in periods 1 and 2, for each state s.
In period 0, the entrepreneur can invest his initial wealth plus the amount borrowed from
the consumer,
k0 ≤ n + d0.
In period 1, the entrepreneur’s cash ﬂow is equal to current revenues minus maintenance costs.
5Part of these funds are used to pay d1s to the consumer, the rest goes to ﬁnance current
investment. The budget constraint is then
qs (k1s − χsk0) ≤ ask0 − γχsk0 − d1s.
Finally, in period 2, the entrepreneur can consume the ﬁnal revenues net of debt repayments,
ce
2s ≤ Ak1s − d2s.
The consumer’s budget constraints are easily derived. If he accepts the contract, his ex-
pected utility is





e + d1s − qskT



















I will assume throughout the paper that e is suﬃciently large that the non-negativity con-





πs (d1s + d2s).
Financial contracts are subject to a form of limited commitment, both on the entrepreneur’s
and on the consumer’s side. Consider ﬁrst the entrepreneur. In periods 1 and 2 he chooses
whether or not to make the contractual payments d1s and d2s. If he fails to pay, he gets to
make a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to the consumer regarding current and future payments. If the
consumer rejects the oﬀer, the ﬁrm is liquidated. When the ﬁrm is liquidated a fraction (1 − θ)
of the ﬁrm’s current proﬁts is lost, where θ is a scalar in (0,1).T h e r e s t o f t h e p r o ﬁts and
the ﬁrm’s capital stock go to the consumer. Therefore, if liquidation occurs in period 1, the
consumer receives the revenue θask0 and the capital stock k0. The latter can be either scrapped
or sold on the asset market after paying the maintenance costs.9 Given that the price of capital





s πs (θas +1− γ)
n.
This ensures that the consumer is neither constrained in period 0, when choosing whether to accept the ﬁnancial
contract, nor in period 1, when choosing how much to invest in the traditional sector.
9The consumer might also use some of this capital in his traditional ﬁrm. Since there is a competitive market
for capital, this option is irrelevant. Notice also that, in the event of a default, the entrepreneur has no incentive
to pay the maintenance cost.
6is qs, the consumer will pay the maintenance costs as long as qs − γ>0. Therefore, the net
value of a liquidated ﬁrm in period 1 is
¡
θas +( qs − γ)+
¢
k0. From now on, the notation (.)+
will be used to denote the non-negative part of a variable, e. g., (qs − γ)+ ≡ max{qs − γ,0}.
In period 2, the value of a liquidated ﬁrm is simply θAk1s. Since state-contingent contracts
are available, I can, without loss of generality, restrict attention to contracts where default and
renegotiation never happen in equilibrium. The entrepreneur will never default if and only if
the following inequalities are satisﬁed
d1s + d2s ≤
¡
θas +( qs − γ)+
¢
k0, (2)
d2s ≤ θAk1s, (3)
for s = l,h. A natural interpretation of these constraints is that the liquidation value of the
ﬁrm acts as collateral for the ﬁnancial obligations of the entrepreneur.
The consumer can always walk away from a ﬁnancial contract and his current and future
income cannot be seized. Then, the consumer no-default conditions are
d1s + d2s ≥ 0, (4)
d2s ≥ 0, (5)





,c a n n o tb eu s e da sc o l l a t e r a l
in ﬁnancial contracts.
For simplicity, I consider only bilateral ﬁnancial contracts involving one entrepreneur and
one consumer, which, in the current environment, is without loss of generality. In particular,
cross-holdings of ﬁnancial securities across entrepreneurs are irrelevant, given that there is only
aggregate uncertainty.10
Three additional assumptions will be useful in the analysis. First, I assume that the
liquidation value of entrepreneurial ﬁr m si ss u ﬃciently small.
Assumption A The parameter θ is small enough that the following inequalities hold
X
s
πs (θas +1− γ) < 1,
θA < 1.
10See Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) for a thorough discussion of this issue in a related model.
7This will imply that investment cannot be fully ﬁnanced with outside funds either in period 0
or 1. Second, I impose some restrictions on the shocks al and ah, and on the maintenance cost
γ.
Assumption B The values of al and ah are such that
(1 − θ)ah + θA− 1 > 0,
al + θA− γ<0.
The maintenance cost γ satisﬁes γ<q .
The ﬁrst two conditions will be used to show that entrepreneurs’ investment is positive in the
high state and negative in the low state. The last condition allows me to rule out scrapping
of capital in equilibrium. Finally, the next assumption simpliﬁes the analysis by ruling out
multiple equilibria in the asset market at date 1.






kT is increasing in kT.
2.2 Equilibrium deﬁnition
The entrepreneur’s individual problem is to choose a ﬁnancial contract and investment and
consumption levels so as to maximize expected utility subject to the budget constraints, the
consumer’s participation constraint, and the no-default constraints introduced above. The
consumer’s problem is to choose which ﬁnancial contract to accept, if any, and, then, set
consumption and investment in the traditional ﬁrm so as to maximize expected utility subject
to the budget constraints. Both the entrepreneur and the consumer take as given the vector
of asset prices {qs}.
A symmetric competitive equilibrium is given by a vector of asset prices {qs},aﬁnancial
contract hd0,{d1s,d 2s}i, investment and consumption decisions for the entrepreneur k0 and
{χ1s,k 1s,c e






such that entrepreneurs’ and consumers’ behavior are optimal, and goods and capital markets
clear in all periods and states.
3 Equilibrium
In this section, I give a characterization of the equilibrium. First, I will look at the optimal
borrowing and investment decisions of the entrepreneur for given asset prices {qs}.N e x t , I
8will show how the entrepreneurs’ aggregate behavior aﬀects the asset prices which clear the
capital market in period 1. Finally, I will put the two pieces together and show how equilibrium
borrowing and investment are determined. It is useful, however, to begin with a preliminary
result regarding the capital market in period 1.
Lemma 1 In equilibrium asset prices are characterized by the conditions






1s =( k0 − k1s)+ ,
for s = l,h, and no scrapping occurs in equilibrium, χs =1for s = l,h.
From this lemma it follows that two cases are possible in period 1 capital market. In the
ﬁrst case, the price of capital is one, the traditional sector chooses zero investment (recall
that F0 (0) = 1), and the entrepreneurial sector makes positive investment k1s − k0 > 0.T h i s
investment is done by transforming consumption goods into capital goods. In the second case,
the price of capital is smaller than one, no consumption goods are transformed into capital, and
the entrepreneurial sector sells capital to the traditional sector. In this case market clearing
requires kT





This result implies that equilibrium asset prices are bounded
q ≤ qs ≤ 1. (6)
Since q >γby Assumption B, this also implies that qs − γ>0 which rules out scrapping of
capital in equilibrium. Both properties will help in the characterization of optimal ﬁnancial
contracts.
3.1 Optimal ﬁnancial contracts
Since scrapping is never optimal, I simplify the notation by deﬁning net proﬁts per unit of
capital
xs = as − γ.
Moreover, I describe the ﬁnancial contract in terms of the net present value of promised












The entrepreneur’s problem can be written in the following form. The entrepreneur chooses
the ﬁnancial contract hd0,{b1s,b 2s}i and the investment levels k0 and {k1s} to maximize
X
s
πs (A − b2s)k1s, (7)
subject to the budget constraints
k0 ≤ n + d0, (8)
qsk1s ≤ (qs + xs − b1s)k0 + b2sk1s for s = l,h, (9)
t h en o - d e f a u l tc o n s t r a i n t s
0 ≤ b1s ≤ θas + qs − γ for s = l,h, (10)
0 ≤ b2s ≤ θA for s = l,h, (11)





and non-negativity constraints for k0 and k1s. The following lemma gives a characterization of
optimal ﬁnancial contracts.
Lemma 2 Given a vector of equilibrium prices {qs}s=l,h, an individually optimal ﬁnancial
contract satisﬁes the conditions
b1s =0 if z0 <z 1s, (13a)
b1s ∈ [0,θa s + qs − γ] if z0 = z1s, (13b)
b1s = θas + qs − γ if z0 >z 1s, (13c)
b2s = θA,













10The variables z0 and z1s deﬁned in (14)-(15) are the Lagrange multipliers on the budget
constraints at dates 0 and 1, they represent the r a t e so fr e t u r no ne n t r e p r e n e u r i a lw e a l t hin
periods 0 and 1.12 Since they play an important role in the analysis to follow, let me provide
some intuition for them. When investing in period 1, the entrepreneur can buy capital at the
price qs and ﬁnance this investment by borrowing θA per unit of capital. One dollar of internal
funds can thus be leveraged by a factor of 1/(qs − θA). At date 2 this investment gives A per
unit of capital, of which θA is paid to consumers. Therefore, the marginal return on internal
funds available in period 1 is z1s =( 1− θ)A/(qs − θA). Going back to period 0, one extra
dollar of internal funds at date 0 can be leveraged by a factor of 1/(1 −
P
s πsb1s) and the
capital invested gives a random net payoﬀ of qs + xs − b1s in period 1. This net payoﬀ can
then be reinvested at the rate of return z1s. Averaging across states gives expression (15).
The choice of the repayment ratios {b1s} depends on the comparison of rates of return
on internal funds in periods 0 and 1, state by state. Suppose the entrepreneur increases his
borrowing in period 0 by πs dollars by promising one dollar in period 1 in state s. The increase
in funds available at date 0 increases the entrepreneur’s utility by πsz0, while the decrease
in funds available at date 1 decreases the entrepreneur’s utility by z1s with probability πs.
Comparing these marginal eﬀects shows that as long as z0 >z 1s the entrepreneur will increase
his promised repayments in state s, up to the point where b1s = θas + qs − γ. If, instead,
z0 <z 1s the entrepreneur will decrease his promised repayments until b1s =0 .A n i n t e r i o r
choice for b1s will only arise if z0 = z1s.
The choice of the repayments in period 2 is much simpler. The marginal utility of entrepre-
neurial wealth is always equal to one in period 2, since at that point the entrepreneur can only
consume. Given that z1s > 1 in all states, this implies that the entrepreneur always commits
to maximum repayments in period 2, b2s = θA, in order to maximize investment in period 1.
The argument above shows that the optimal ﬁnancial contract depends on the prices qs
through their eﬀect on the rates of return z1s and z0. In turns, the prices qs depend on the
contracts chosen by the entrepreneurs, since they determine how much capital they sell on date
1. I will now look at this relation, before turning to general equilibrium.
12More precisely, z1s is the Lagrange multiplier normalized by the probability πs.
113.2 Asset prices
Consider the asset market in period 1, taking as given the ﬁnancial contract chosen by the
entrepreneurs. Net investment by the entrepreneurs is
k1s − k0 =
xs + θA− b1s
qs − θA
k0 (16)
for s = l,h. This expression comes from rearranging (9) and using the result that the ﬁnancial
constraint is always binding in period 2 (from Lemma 2). It is not diﬃcult to show that in the
high state the right-hand side of (16) is positive and so is investment. The opposite happens
in the low state.13 Then, Lemma 1 implies that qh =1and ql < 1. Therefore, let me focus on
the determination of the asset price in the low state.
In the low state, the entrepreneurial ﬁrm is facing net losses, since xlk0 < 0.D u et ot h e
collateral constraint, the ﬁrm has limited ability to borrow against future income. If it tried
to keep the existing capital stock unchanged, its borrowing capacity would be insuﬃcient to
cover current losses, since b2lk0 ≤ θAk0 < −xlk0 (the ﬁrst inequality follows from no default,
the second from Assumption B). Moreover, the ﬁrm has limited ability to buy insurance ex
ante, due to consumers’ limited commitment, b1l ≥ 0. The only remaining option to cover the
ﬁrm’s losses is to sell part of the capital stock. To induce the traditional sector to absorb this
capital the price of capital has to fall below 1.
Figure 1 gives a graphical illustration of the equilibrium in the low state, for given values
of k0 and b1l.C u r v e S plots the entrepreneurs’ supply of capital as a function of ql.F o r
completeness, the ﬁgure includes the regions where ql ≥ A and ql ≤ γ, although such prices
never arise in equilibrium. When γ<q l <Athe entrepreneurs’ behavior is captured by
(16) and the supply of capital is given by −(xl + θA− b1l)k0/(ql − θA).N o t i c et h a ti nt h i s
region the supply is decreasing in ql: a price increase allows entrepreneurs to sell a smaller
amount of capital to cover their losses.14 When ql goes above A, entrepreneurial investment
becomes unproﬁtable and entrepreneurs sell all the capital stock k0. Finally, when ql goes
below γ scrapping is optimal and entrepreneurial capital is destroyed. In the same ﬁgure, I
plot the traditional sector demand for capital, described by the condition ql = F0 (k0 − k1l).
13See Lemma 4 in the Appendix.
14The fact that the supply is decreasing has two implications: it magniﬁes the eﬀect of entrepreneurial losses
on asset prices, and it opens the door to multiple equilibria. The ampliﬁcation is important because it increases
the quantitative relevance of the pecuniary externality discussed in Section 4. Multiplicity is ruled out in this
paper, by virtue of Assumption C. Gai, Kapadia, Millard and Perez (2006) study the implications of a similar
model, focusing on the case where multiple equilibria are possible.
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Figure 1: Asset market equilibrium
The equilibrium is determined at the point where the two curves meet.
Figure 1 can be used to show the relation between the ﬁnancial contract and the asset price
ql. The choice of {b1s} aﬀects the equilibrium price in two ways. An increase in either b1l or







and thus increases entrepreneurial losses in the low state. Moreover, an increase in b1l directly
increases repayments in the low state. Both channels lead to an increase in −(xl + θA− b1l)k0
and to a fall in the equilibrium asset price. This mechanism is illustrated by the curve S0 in
Figure 1, which shows the eﬀect of an increase in borrowing, leading to a rightward shift of
the entrepreneurs’ supply and to a lower equilibrium price.
3.3 Equilibrium hedging
Putting together entrepreneurs’ optimality and the equilibrium determination of asset prices I
can show that an equilibrium exists and I can characterize the equilibrium ﬁnancial contract.
From now on, I will use the superscript CE to denote equilibrium values.





Depending on parameters, the equilibrium ﬁnancial contract is of one of the following types:
1. 0 ≤ bCE
1h <θ a h +1− γ and bCE
1l =0 ;
2. bCE
1h = θah +1− γ and bCE
1l =0 ;
3. bCE
1h = θah +1− γ and 0 ≤ bCE
1l ≤ θal + qCE
l − γ.
This proposition shows that there is a “pecking order” of repayments in diﬀerent aggregate
states. Entrepreneurs must ﬁrst exhaust their borrowing capacity in the high state (setting
b1h = θah+1−γ), before they start borrowing against revenue in the low state (setting b1l > 0).
In the low state, the entrepreneurs are poor and the demand for assets is low. The associated
fall in asset prices increases z1l and induces entrepreneurs, ex ante, to reduce their promised
repayments in that state. In equilibria of types 1 and 2, this incentive is suﬃciently strong
that entrepreneurs keep their promised repayments to zero in the low state. In equilibria of
type 3, instead, the beneﬁts from hedging are dominated by the return on investment at date
0. In this case, entrepreneurs decide to oﬀer positive repayments also in the low state, in order
to raise more capital at date 0.
The general principle behind this result is that endogenous movements in asset prices
determine the entrepreneurs’ incentive to hedge aggregate shocks. In Section 4, I will show
that the social beneﬁts of this hedging are, in general, diﬀerent from the private beneﬁts.
3.4 A graphical illustration
An implication of Proposition 1 is that the equilibrium ﬁnancial contract can be summarized
by the variable ρ ≡
P
s πsb1s capturing the ratio of outside borrowing to total capital invested
at date 0. For low levels of ρ all the borrowing is against revenue in the high state, while if ρ is
greater than the cutoﬀ ˆ ρ ≡ πh (θah +1− γ) the entrepreneurs also borrow against revenue in
the low state. To illustrate the determination of the equilibrium ﬁnancial contract, in Figure
2, I plot the relation between ρ and the rates of return on entrepreneurial wealth z0 and z1s.
For each value of ρ, I derive the corresponding values of the state-contingent payments {b1s}








(a) Type 1 Equilibrium 






Figure 2: The borrowing ratio ρ and the rates of return on entrepreneurial wealth
15the corresponding values of z0 and z1s, as in 3.1, and look for an optimal ﬁnancial contract.
Notice that when ρ<ˆ ρ the entrepreneur is choosing an interior solution for b1h.I nt h i sc a s e ,
the relevant marginal trade-oﬀ is between investing more at date 0 and investing in the high
state at date 1. On the other hand, when ρ>ˆ ρ the trade-oﬀ is between investing at date 0
and investing in the low state at date 1. Hence, in the ﬁrst region I plot z1h as the relevant ex
post rate of return, while in the second region I plot z1l. The ex ante return is always equal to
z0.
Consider now how an increase in borrowing changes the returns to entrepreneurial wealth
in periods 0 and 1. As ρ increases the price of capital ql falls. This tends to reduce the ex
ante return on entrepreneurial wealth, z0, given that entrepreneurs face bigger expected capital
losses in period 1.15 At the same time, the ex post return on entrepreneurial wealth tends to
increase for two reasons. First, if ρ crosses the cutoﬀ ˆ ρ there is a discrete upward jump in
the rate of return, since z1l >z 1h.F u r t h e r m o r e , o n c e a b o v e ˆ ρ, the rate of return z1l keeps
increasing. As ql falls an extra dollar available in the low state earns a higher return between
periods 1 and 2. The equilibrium is determined at the point where the two rates of return are
equalized, except in the cases where the entrepreneur is against a corner for both b1l and b1h.
Panels (a) and (b) of Figure 2 illustrate two cases of interior equilibria. In the ﬁrst case the
equilibrium is of type 1 and z1h = z0, in the second the equilibrium is of type 3 and z1l = z0.
4W e l f a r e
L e tm en o wt u r nt oe ﬃciency. Consider a planner who, at date 0, can choose the ﬁnancial
contract hd0,{d1s},{d2s}i. The planner faces the same constraints as the private economy,
in particular: (i) the ﬁnancial contract is subject to default and renegotiation, and (ii) the
allocation of used capital in period 1 is determined on an anonymous spot market. The only
diﬀerence between the planner and the individual entrepreneur is that the planner takes into
account the relation between the ﬁnancial contract and the equilibrium price on the capital
market. That is, instead of taking {qs} as given, the planner’s problem includes the constraints






1s =( k0 − k1s)+ . (18)
15Notice that, in general, the relation between ρ and z0 is not necessarily monotone, given that the expression
(15) also includes z1l. However, the diﬀerence z1s − z0 is locally monotone in ρ,a r o u n da n ye q u i l i b r i u m ,w h i c h
ensures that the equilibrium is unique. See the proof of Proposition 1 for the detailed derivations behind this
statement and for analytical derivations which mirror the graphical presentation in this section.
16As in the previous section, I will describe a ﬁnancial contract in terms of the initial loan
d0 and the repayments per unit of capital {b1s,b 2s}. The Pareto frontier is deﬁn e db yt h e
following planner’s problem. Fix a given utility level for the consumers, ¯ U. The planner chooses
hd0,{b1s,b 2s}i, k0,a n d{k1s} to maximize the entrepreneurs’ expected utility (7), subject to the
budget constraints (8)-(9), the no-default constraints (10)-(11), the constraints (17)-(18), and a
constraint on consumers’ expected utility, which takes the place of the consumers’ participation
constraint,
















≥ ¯ U. (19)
Since asset prices also determine the proﬁts of the traditional sector, this is taken into account
when writing constraint (19).
Let me ﬁrst show that the only substantial diﬀerence between this problem and the problem
of the individual entrepreneur, is, indeed, the endogeneity of asset prices. Suppose asset prices
are set at their competitive equilibrium level, i.e., replace (17)-(18) with qs = qCE
s .S e ta l s o¯ U
at its equilibrium level, denoted by UCE. Then it would be optimal for the planner to choose
kT


























it follows that (19) could be replaced by
(12). Since (17) and (18) are no longer present, the planner’s problem would then be identical
to the individual problem, and the competitive ﬁnancial contract would be optimal.16
I now go back to the original formulation of the planner’s problem. In order for that
problem to be well deﬁned, ¯ U cannot be too large, or the constraint set may be empty. Let
me assume that this is the case, and let me also assume that ¯ U is such that the entrepreneur
gets positive utility. Moreover, as in the previous section, I will ignore the non-negativity
constraints for consumers’ consumption, assuming that e is suﬃciently large.
The following proposition gives a characterization of a constrained eﬃcient allocation, which
is denoted by an asterisk.
Proposition 2 Suppose the value of ¯ U is such that the entrepreneur can achieve positive





16Kehoe and Levine (1993) call this property “conditional constrained eﬃciency.”
17and promised repayments satisfy
b∗
1s =0 if λ∗ <z ∗
1s,
b∗
1s ∈ [0,θa s + q∗
s − γ] if λ∗ = z∗
1s,
b∗
1s = θas + q∗
























which holds as a strict inequality if z∗
0 6= z∗
1l.
The characterization of the ﬁnancial contract parallels the result in Lemma 2. As in the
individual problem the planner chooses the promised repayments in each state comparing the
marginal return on entrepreneurial wealth in periods 0 and 1. The social return on entre-
preneurial wealth in period 1, z∗
1s, is identical to the private rate of return, as can be seen
comparing (14) and (21). However, the social rate of return in period 0 is now captured by
λ∗. Inequality (22) shows that λ∗ is smaller or equal than the corresponding expression for the
private rate of return.
4.1 Over-borrowing
Let me now use this characterization to show that over-borrowing can arise in equilibrium.
Recall that ρ =
P
s πsb1s is the ratio between the net present value of promised repayments
and capital invested at date 0, introduced in Section 3.4. Thanks to Proposition 2, a socially
optimal ﬁnancial contract can be fully characterized by the ratio ρ,a si tw a st h ec a s ef o rt h e
competitive equilibrium contract. Therefore, I can focus on the comparison of ρ∗ and ρCE.T o
prove next proposition it is convenient to introduce a slightly stronger version of Assumption
C.17
17Assumption C’ is stronger because η>1.N o t i c e t h a t limπl→0 η =1 , so the two assumptions tend to be
equivalent for low values of πl.
18Assumption C’ The function F satisﬁes the following condition
F0 ¡
kT¢
− θA+ ηF00 ¡
kT¢
kT > 0,
where η ≡ (1 − πh (θah +1− γ) − πl (xl + θA))/(1 −
P
s πs (θas +1− γ)).
This condition is suﬃcient to show that when the planner increases the borrowing ratio ρ,t h i s
increases the sales of used capital by entrepreneurs in the low state. Under Assumptions A, B,
and C’, the following proposition shows that under-borrowing never arises in equilibrium, and
over-borrowing arises if the equilibrium is of type 1.
Proposition 3 (over-borrowing) Let ¯ U = UCE, then a constrained eﬃcient ﬁnancial contract
satisﬁes ρ∗ ≤ ρCE. The inequality is strict if the equilibrium is of type 1.
This result is due to the presence of a pecuniary externality: the ﬁnancial decisions of
the entrepreneurs aﬀect the equilibrium price on the capital market in period 1, and this
price aﬀects the allocation of wealth between entrepreneurs and consumers. To clarify why
this leads to a welfare loss consider the following experiment. Suppose the equilibrium is of
type 1 and suppose entrepreneurs and consumers get together in period 0 and coordinate to
reduce entrepreneurial investment in the initial period by dk0 < 0, by reducing b1h.S i n c e
z0 = z1h, the direct eﬀect of this change on the entrepreneurs’ utility is zero. However, in
general equilibrium this change implies a reduced supply of used capital and a higher asset
price in the low state, dql > 0. Since entrepreneurs are sellers of capital in that state, an
increase in the asset price increases entrepreneurial wealth by (k0 − k1l)dql dollars. At the
same time, by the envelope theorem, (k0 − k1l)dql corresponds to the reduction in proﬁts
for ﬁrms in the traditional sector. Suppose the entrepreneurs compensate the consumers for
this proﬁtl o s sb yg i v i n gt h e mπl (k0 − k1l)dql at date 0. The marginal cost of this transfer
is z0πl (k0 − k1l)dql since z0 is the entrepreneurs’ marginal utility of funds. The expected
marginal beneﬁt associated to the increase in asset prices at date 1 is πlz1l (k0 − k1l)dql.T h e
net eﬀect of this local perturbation on the entrepreneurs’ utility is
πl (z1l − z0)(k0 − k1l)dql, (23)
which is positive since z1l >z 1h = z0 and dql > 0. This gives a Pareto improvement, as


















(b) Type 3 Equilibrium 
Figure 3: The borrowing ratio ρ and the private and social returns to entrepreneurial invest-
ment.
204.2 A graphical illustration
Figure 3 is the analogous to Figure 2 for the case of the planner. Proposition 2 shows that the
socially optimal contract satisﬁes the same pecking order identiﬁed for equilibrium contracts.
Therefore, also in this case it is possible to represent the optimal ﬁnancial contract in terms
of the borrowing ratio ρ.F o r e a c h l e v e l o f ρ, I plot the corresponding values of z1s and z0,
capturing the private beneﬁts from ex ante and ex post investment. As in Figure 2, I plot z1h
when ρ<ˆ ρ and z1l when ρ>ˆ ρ. In the same picture I use a dashed line to plot λ,t h es o c i a l
beneﬁts on entrepreneurial investment at date 0. As shown in Proposition 2 the social beneﬁts
from investment at date 1 coincide with the private beneﬁts and are captured by z1s.
The diﬀerence between the private and social beneﬁts of ex ante investment, z0 and λ,
are due to the pecuniary externality discussed above. An increase in borrowing has the eﬀect
of reducing ql, and thus reallocating funds from entrepreneurs to consumers at date 1.T h e
welfare eﬀect of this reallocation is given by (23). Therefore, the diﬀerence between λ and
z0 has the same sign as z0 − z1l. In panel (a) the graph of λ is below that of z0,g i v e nt h a t
z1l is above z0 for the whole range of ρ. In panel (b), instead, the graph of λ crosses that of
z0 at the point where z1l − z0 =0 . In the case depicted in panel (a), this implies that, at
the competitive equilibrium λ<z 1h. Therefore, a reduction in borrowing leads to a Pareto
improvement. In the case depicted in panel (b), instead, the competitive equilibrium arises
precisely when z1l = z0, so there is no room for a Pareto improvement.
The latter argument suggests that equilibria of type 3 are constrained eﬃcient. This is
indeed the case in speciﬁc examples, such as the one depicted in panel (b). However, due to
the non-concavity of the planner’s problem, the result cannot be established in general.
4.3 Sources of ineﬃciency
The two imperfections introduced in the model are limited commitment on the entrepreneurs’
and on the consumers’ side. Both are at the roots of the ineﬃciency result. If I removed the
entrepreneurs’ commitment problem, by setting θ =1 , the economy would reach a ﬁrst-best
allocation where all the consumption goods in periods 0 and 1 are devoted to investment.18
In this case, not surprisingly, there is no ineﬃciency. Limited commitment on the consumers’
side plays a subtler role. Consider the case of an equilibrium of type 1 where expression (23)
18Note that, in this case, the non-negativity constraint for consumers’ consumption are binding. See the
appendix for the formal analysis of this case.
21is positive since z1l >z 0. In this case, the reduction in borrowing is beneﬁcial because the
ex post value of funds to the entrepreneurs is larger than their value ex ante. This can only
happen if the entrepreneur has limited ability to transfer resources between period 0 and period
1( i ns t a t el). In the model, this happens because the constraint b1l ≥ 0 is binding, so the
entrepreneurs are not allowed to buy more insurance against the low state. A coordinated
reduction in borrowing, as described in 4.1, allows the entrepreneurs to partially circumvent
the problem. Borrowing less ex ante leads to an increase in asset prices in the low state
and, thus, it is an indirect way for entrepreneurs to transfer resources to the low state. This
argument suggests that the pecuniary externality identiﬁed here will also be relevant in other
environments where the entrepreneurs have diﬃculty channeling resources to the low state, for
example, in models with full commitment on the consumers’ side but without state-contingent
debt.
It is useful to remark that in this framework the ineﬃciency is not due to fact that the price
ql aﬀects the collateral available to entrepreneurs. As just noticed, the pecuniary externality
identiﬁed matters when the constraint b1l ≥ 0 is binding. In that case, the collateral constraint
b1l ≤ θal + ql − γ is slack and the fact that an increase in ql increases the entrepreneur’s
borrowing capacity at date 0 is irrelevant for entrepreneurs. Asset prices matter here because
they determine the asset side of entrepreneurs’ balance sheets, not because of their eﬀects on
their capacity to borrow. In a model with endogenous asset prices in period 2, it would be
possible to study the eﬀect of asset prices on borrowing capacity in period 1, and to study a
“collateral channel” diﬀerent from the asset price channel discussed here.
As a ﬁnal observation, notice that constraint (19), with ¯ U = UCE, ensures that consumers
are as well oﬀ at a constrained eﬃcient allocation as at the competitive allocation. One
may ask, though, whether there should be an additional constraint to ensure that consumers
participate voluntarily to the ﬁnancial contract hd∗
0,{b∗
1s,b ∗





1s. In the analysis so far, I have left this constraint aside, to simplify the exposition,
but it can be shown that the constraint is not binding at a constrained eﬃcient allocation. The
proof of this claim is in the appendix (Lemma 8).
4.4 Remarks on policy
Regulatory interventions that impose minimum capitalization on ﬁnancial ﬁrms are widespread
in industrialized economies, and often their introduction is justiﬁe db a s e do nt h ei d e at h a t
22excessive leverage in the ﬁnancial sector may bring about an increase in “systemic risk.” The
model presented here gives a welfare-based rationale to this idea. When the equilibrium is
ineﬃcient, policies that restricts borrowing ex ante can restore constrained eﬃciency. For
example, the planner can impose a capital requirement of the form νk0 ≤ n,w h i c hi m p o s e s
that a minimum fraction ν of the ﬁrm’s assets are ﬁnanced with insiders’ capital. Given that
both the planner’s optimum and the entrepreneur’s optimum follow the same “pecking order,”
a restriction of this type is suﬃcient to ensure that the eﬃcient ﬁnancial contract {b∗
1s} is
chosen.
Proposition 4 Given a constrained eﬃcient allocation, there is a capital requirement ν and
at r a n s f e rτ0 from entrepreneurs to consumers, such that the corresponding equilibrium is
constrained eﬃcient.
An open question is how capital requirements should be calibrated for investments with
diﬀerent risky proﬁles. Existing capital requirements are usually based on the riskiness of the
individual investment, using some measure of “value at risk.” The framework of this paper
can be extended to analyze models with diﬀerent types of investment. In particular, one can
consider a model where the cash-ﬂows xs of diﬀerent investments have diﬀerent exposure to the
aggregate shock. In that case, the investments with a larger pecuniary externality are those
which are more correlated with the aggregate shock, since they are the ones that contribute
more to a drop in asset prices in the event of a bad shock. This points to the idea of optimal
capital requirements that depend on macroeconomic correlations and not just on measures of
individual risk. In particular, it might be desirable that investments with higher correlation
with macroeconomic conditions be subject to tighter requirements.19
5C o n c l u s i o n s
The policy debate on ﬁnancial supervision and regulation has been recently shifting towards a
“macroprudential” approach (Borio, 2003). According to this approach the regulator should
be concerned most of all about the aggregate consequences of ﬁnancial instability and the
main source of instability is identiﬁed in the common exposure to macroeconomic risks across
ﬁnancial institutions. The present paper provides at the same time a warning and a justiﬁcation
for this approach. The warning is that aggregate volatility and some degree of ﬁnancial fragility
19See Borio (2003, p.10) for a discussion of recent policy proposals that go in this direction.
23are unavoidable in presence of ﬁnancial constraints, and that a reduction in ﬁnancial fragility
can only be achieved at the cost of reducing investment ex ante. Deﬁning the objective of
the regulator only in terms of reducing volatility, and disregarding the productive eﬀects of
capital accumulation, may be misleading. On the other hand, the welfare analysis in this
paper provides a justiﬁcation for a macroprudential approach. In a framework with ﬁnancial
constraints, private agents may underestimate the damage associated to a contraction in their
wealth and, therefore, policies that limit their losses in a crisis may be welfare improving.
In practice, capital requirements are imposed on a speciﬁcc l a s so fﬁr m s ,t y p i c a l l yo nc o m -
mercial banks and ﬁnancial intermediaries. To have a fully ﬂedged theory of capital require-
ments would require an explicit model of ﬁnancial intermediation. If entrepreneurial ﬁrms,
which are more ﬁnancially constrained, are also more reliant on bank credit, capital require-
ments on banks can help to stabilize the balance sheet of the ﬁrms that need it most. The
analysis of capital requirements in an explicit framework with intermediation remains a topic
for future research.
The model presented shows that over-borrowing is a possibility. However, it also shows
that in some equilibria (e.g., the equilibrium illustrated in panel (b) of Figure 3) the gains
from ex ante investment are suﬃciently large that both the private economy and the planner
choose the same high level of borrowing. Therefore, the presence and the severity of over-
borrowing in speciﬁc episodes becomes an empirical issue. In particular, the model indicates
that some relevant quantitative questions that should be addressed are: how much the presence
of ﬁnancial distress contributes to the fall in asset prices during ﬁnancial crises, and how much
that contributes to the propagation of ﬁnancial distress across the economy.
Let me conclude with some remarks on the notion of constrained eﬃciency used in this
paper. The social planner introduced here is constrained to take as given both the limited
commitment problem in ﬁnancial contracts, and the fact that asset prices are determined in
a spot market. The point of this exercise is both theoretical and practical. First, it is useful
to consider a restrictive notion of constrained eﬃciency to identify minimal conditions under
which a planner can improve upon the competitive allocation. Second, it is interesting to
focus on policy interventions that impose restrictions on ﬁnancial contracts, since they seem
close to regulatory policies already in place. However, this environment naturally suggests
that interventions in diﬀerent markets (e.g., the asset market) can have important interactions
with the equilibrium ﬁnancial structure. Extensions of the welfare analysis to the case where
24the planner can intervene directly in the asset market are left to future research. This type of
extensions will be of particular interest when one turns to monetary versions of the model and
studies its implications for optimal monetary policy.20
Finally, one could allow the planner to directly intervene to relax the limited commitment
constraints. In particular, Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) argue that the supply of public liq-
uidity can alleviate the lack of commitment on the consumers’ side. The government can issue
state contingent bonds in period 0, and tax consumers in period 1 to repay these bonds. Let the
tax on consumers be denoted by τs. Then, a model with public liquidity is formally equivalent
to the model presented here, if the consumers’ no-default constraint in period 1 is replaced
by d1s + d2s ≥− τs. This policy allows entrepreneurs to buy more insurance against the low
state, by holding state-contingent government bonds. By setting a suﬃciently high value for
τs, the government is able to replicate the equilibrium of an economy with full commitment on
the consumers’ side. As argued above, in 4.3, this would eliminate the pecuniary externality
identiﬁed in this paper. Clearly, there are a number of reasons why liquidity creation by the
government may be costly and imperfect (e.g., the distortionary eﬀects of taxation). In all
these cases, the possibility of excessive borrowing remains open.
20Recent papers on optimal monetary policy in economies with ﬁnancial frictions include Iacoviello (2005)
and Faia and Monacelli (2007).
256 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Lemma 1
The consumer chooses kT







1s. Recall that F is strictly concave and F0 (0) = 1. Therefore, if qs ≥ 1 optimal investment is
kT
1s =0 , while if qs < 1, kT





Recall that consumption goods can be turned into capital goods one for one but not the converse.
This has two implications. First, by arbitrage, the price of capital must satisfy qs ≤ 1. Second, aggregate
investment must be non-negative,
kT
1s + k1s − χsk0 ≥ 0.
If aggregate investment is positive, then, by arbitrage, the price of capital must be qs =1 .I n t h i s
case, optimality for the traditional sector gives kT
1s =0 , and, thus, investment by entrepreneurs must
be positive, k1s − χsk0 > 0. If, instead, aggregate investment is zero, then we have kT
1s = χsk0 − k1s.
In this case, optimality for the traditional sector implies that either kT
1s =0and qs =1or kT
1s > 0 and
qs < 1. The following conditions hold in all the cases considered






1s =( χsk0 − k1s)+ . (25)




and, due to Assumption B, q − γ is positive. These two
facts imply that qs ≥ q >γ . If any entrepreneur is scrapping capital in period 1, it is always a proﬁtable
deviation to pay the maintenance cost γ and sell the capital. Therefore, no scrapping takes place in
equilibrium, χs =1 . Substituting χs =1in (25) completes the proof. ¥
6.2 Lemma 3
The following is a useful additional result which will be used in the equilibrium characterization.
Lemma 3 The equilibrium price of capital satisﬁes
qs − θA > 0, (26)
for each s.
Proof. If kT
1s =0then qs =1and the result follows immediately from Assumption A. If instead
kT














6.3 Proof of Lemma 2
Consider the problem of maximizing (7) subject to (8)-(12) and non-negativity constraints for k0 and
{k1s}. Given the bounds for equilibrium prices (6) and (26), and given Assumption A, it is possible to
show that the constraint set is non-empty and compact, hence a solution exists.
Consider the entrepreneur’s problem deﬁned in terms of the original variables {d1s,d 2s}.I t c a n
be shown that the problem stated above (in terms of {b1s,b 2s}), is equivalent to the original problem.
That is, for any hd0,{d1s,d 2s}i and hk0,{k1s}i in the feasible set of the original problem, there is a
hd0,{b1s,b 2s}i and hk0,{k1s}i in the feasible set of the transformed problem, which achieves the same
payoﬀ; the converse is also true. These statements are obvious when k0 > 0 and k1s > 0 for all s.
When k0 =0or k1s =0for some s,t h e yr e l yo nt h ef o l l o w i n gf a c t s :( i )k0 =0 ,( 2 ) ,a n d( 4 )i m p l y
d1s + d2s =0 ; (ii) k1s =0 ,( 3 ) ,a n d( 5 )i m p l yd2s =0 .
26Let me replace (8) and (12) with the constraint




It is easy to show that if (8’) is satisﬁed, there exists a d0 such that both (8) and (12) are satisﬁed.
Let z0 and πsz1s denote the Lagrange multipliers associated, respectively, to (8’) and (9). An







πsz1s (qs + xs − b1s) ≤ 0, (27)
πs (A − b2s) − πsz1s (qs − b2s) ≤ 0, (28)
which must hold with strict equality if, respectively, k0 > 0or k1s > 0,
if πsz0k0 − πsz1sk0 < 0 then b1s =0 , (29a)
if πsz0k0 − πsz1sk0 =0then b1s ∈ [0,θa s + qs − γ], (29b)
if πsz0k0 − πsz1sk0 > 0 then b1s = θas + qs − γ, (29c)
if πsz1sk1s − πsk1s < 0 then b2s =0 , (30a)
if πsz1sk1s − πsk1s =0then b2s ∈ [0,θA], (30b)
if πsz1sk1s − πsk1s > 0 then b2s = θA. (30c)






for all s. Using condition (30c) I get b2s = θA for s = l,h. Moreover, since z1s > 0 the constraint (9) is
binding and
k1s =
qs + xs − b1s
qs − θA
k0. (31)
Rearranging condition (27) I get
z0 ≥
P





where z1s > 0, qs + xs − b1s > 0 from (10) and θ<1,a n d
P
s πsb1s < 1 from (10) and Assumption A.
Therefore, z0 > 0, which implies that constraint (8’) is binding and k0 = n+
P
s πsb1sk0 ≥ n>0.T h i s
implies that (27) holds as an equality, and gives (15). Then, (31) implies that k1s > 0,w h i c h ,i nt u r n ,
shows that (28) holds as an equality, giving (14). Finally, conditions (29a)-(29c) give (13a)-(13c) in the
lemma. ¥
6.4 Proof of Proposition 1
The proof is split in three lemmas. I ﬁrst prove the characterization part, then existence and uniqueness.
Lemma 4 In any symmetric equilibrium qh =1>q l and the ﬁnancial contract is of one of the types
1t o3d e ﬁned in Proposition 1.
27Proof. First, let me prove that the prices satisfy qh =1>q l. Rewrite the budget constraint (9) as
(qs − θA)(k1s − k0)=( xs + θA− b1s)k0.
L e m m a3i m p l i e st h a tqs − θA > 0.G i v e nt h a tk0 > 0, as shown in Lemma 2, to prove the statement
regarding asset prices it is suﬃcient to prove that xh + θA − b1h > 0 and xl + θA − b1l < 0,s ot h a t
entrepreneurs’ investment is positive in h and negative in l.T o p r o v e t h e ﬁrst inequality notice that
the no-default constraint, b1h ≤ θah + qh − γ, and inequality (6) imply
xh + θA− b1h ≥ (1 − θ)ah + θA− 1 > 0,
where the second inequality follows from Assumption B. To prove the second inequality notice that
xl + θA− b1l ≤ xl + θA < 0 follows from the consumers’ no-default constraint and Assumption B.








Therefore, one of the following three cases applies (1) z0 ≤ z1h <z 1l,( 2 )z1h <z 0 <z 1l,( 3 )z1h <z 1l ≤
z0. Applying Lemma 2 these three cases give the equilibrium ﬁnancial contracts of types 1 to 3.









for some parameter ρ ≥ 0,w h e r eˆ ρ ≡ πh (θah +1− γ). That is, the equilibrium ﬁnancial contract is
fully characterized by ρ. Notice that, by construction, ρ =
P
s πsb1s, i.e. the parameter ρ captures the
ratio of outside borrowing to total capital invested at date 0.
The next Lemma contains useful results on the relation between ρ and the equilibrium price ql.
Lemma 5 There is an upper bound ¯ ρ such that the contract {b1s} given by (32)-(33) is consistent with
no default if and only if ρ ∈ [0,¯ ρ].F o r e a c h ρ ∈ [0,¯ ρ] there is a unique equilibrium in the low state
capital market. The associated equilibrium price is given by the function ql = Q(ρ), which is continuous
a n dd e c r e a s i n g ,a n di sd i ﬀerentiable except at ρ =ˆ ρ.
Proof. For any ρ ≥ 0,l e t{b1s} be given by (32)-(33). To ﬁnd the corresponding equilibrium in
the l-state asset market I need to ﬁnd a price ql and quantities kT





(ql − θA)(k1l − k0)=( xl + θA− b1l)k0 (from the entrepreneurs’ budget constraint), and kT
1l = k0−k1l.





















˜ b1l =m i n
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and look for a kT





=0 .N o t i c e t h a t f o r e v e r y ρ, (33) ensures that b1h ≤
θah+1−γ, so the no-default condition is satisﬁed in state h. However, with no restrictions on ρ nothing
28ensures that no-default is satisﬁed in state l. For the moment I use condition (35) to ensure that the
no-default condition is satisﬁed by (˜ b1l,b 1h). This construction will allow me, eventually, to ﬁnd a ¯ ρ
such that no-default is satisﬁed if and only if ρ ≤ ¯ ρ.
Step 1. First, I want to prove that for each pair {b1s} there exists a unique kT






=0 . To do that, I will show that the function H: (i) is continuous and increasing in
kT
1l, (ii) is negative at kT
1l =0 , and (iii) is positive at kT
1l = k0. Point (i) follows from Assumption
C and the concavity of F, which implies that ˜ b1l is non-increasing in kT
1l. Point (ii) follows since ³
xl + θA−˜ b1l
´
k0 < 0 (from ˜ b1l ≥ 0 and Assumption B). To prove (iii) notice that
H (k0;b1l,b 1h)=
³
al + F0 (k0) − γ −˜ b1l
´
k0 ≥ (1 − θ)alk0 > 0,
where the ﬁrst inequality follows from the deﬁnition of ˜ b1l, the second from al > 0. The intermediate
value theorem implies that there exists a kT





=0 .S i n c eH is monotone in
kT
1l, the solution is unique.
Step 2. Next, I deﬁne the function Q(ρ) and show that it is continuous and decreasing. For any











. Continuity can be easily established. To prove that Q is decreasing, note that xl + θA − ˜ b1l
is negative, k0 is increasing in both b1l and b1h,a n dxl + θA − ˜ b1l is non-increasing in b1l. Therefore,
H is decreasing in both b1l and b1h. Moreover, H is increasing in kT







=0is increasing in ρ, since, if ρ increases either b1l or b1h must increase. The
concavity of F then implies that Q(ρ) is decreasing.
Step 3. Finally, I ﬁnd the upper bound ¯ ρ and argue that the function Q(ρ) is diﬀerentiable, except
at ρ =ˆ ρ.L e t¯ ρ be such that
1
πl
(¯ ρ − ˆ ρ)=θal + Q(¯ ρ) − γ.
This equation admits a solution ¯ ρ ∈ [ˆ ρ,ˆ ρ + πl (θal +1− γ)] by the intermediate value theorem, given
that 0 <θ a l + Q(ˆ ρ) − γ and θal +1− γ ≥ θal + Q(ˆ ρ + πl (θal +1− γ)) − γ (by (6) and Assumption
B). The solution is unique because Q is decreasing. Moreover, again given that Q is decreasing, I have
b1l = 1
πl (ρ − ˆ ρ) ≤ θal +Q(ρ)−γ if and only if ρ ≤ ¯ ρ. Restricting the function Q to [0,¯ ρ], I can replace
˜ b1l with b1l in (34), and apply the implicit function theorem to show that Q is diﬀerentiable for ρ 6=ˆ ρ.
I can now prove existence and uniqueness.
Lemma 6 There exists a unique symmetric competitive equilibrium.
Proof. Step 1. First, I will deﬁne a function ζ :[ 0 ,¯ ρ] → R.F o re a c hρ,l e tb1l and b2l be given by
(32) and (33), let qh =1and ql = Q(ρ). Substitute in (14) and (15), to obtain {z1s} and z0,a n dl e t
ζ (ρ) ≡
½
z1h − z0 if ρ ∈ [0,ˆ ρ]
z1l − z0 if ρ ∈ (ˆ ρ,¯ ρ] .
The function ζ is continuous and diﬀerentiable except at ˆ ρ.N o t et h a tζ corresponds to the diﬀerence
between the z1s and z0 plotted in Figure 2.
Step 2. The function ζ satisﬁes two properties. First, it satisﬁes ζ (ˆ ρ) < limρ→ˆ ρ+ ζ (ρ). This follows
from the inequality z1h <z 1l, which can be proved for any ρ ∈ [0,¯ ρ] proceeding as in the proof of
Lemma 4. Second, if ζ (ρ)=0and ζ is diﬀerentiable at ρ,t h e nζ
0 (ρ) > 0. To prove this claim, consider














29The last expression is positive given that xl+θA−b1l < 0 (see the proof of Lemma 4), Q0 (ρ) < 0 (from

















which is also positive.
Step 3. Summarizing the properties derived in step 2: ζ is continuous except at ˆ ρ,w h e r ei th a s
an upward jump, and, if it crosses the horizontal axis, it is locally increasing at the point of crossing.
These properties imply that there exists one and only one ρCE ∈ [0,¯ ρ] which satisﬁes one of the
following conditions: (i) ρCE =0and ζ (0) ≥ 0;( i i )ρCE ∈ (0,ˆ ρ) and ζ
¡
ρCE¢
=0 ; (iii) ρCE =ˆ ρ and
ζ (ˆ ρ) ≤ 0 ≤ limρ→ˆ ρ+ ζ (ρ);( i v )ρCE ∈ (ˆ ρ,¯ ρ) and ζ
¡
ρCE¢
=0 ;( v )ρCE =¯ ρ and ζ (¯ ρ) ≤ 0.F o re a c ho f
these cases, it is possible to construct a competitive equilibrium. For example, case (ii) gives bCE
1l =0 ,
bCE
1h = ρCE/πh and zCE
1l >z CE
1h = zCE
0 , showing that the entrepreneur’s optimality conditions derived
in Lemma 2 are satisﬁed. All remaining equilibrium conditions are satisﬁed by construction.







is the equilibrium contract, then ρCE must satisfy one of the conditions (i)-(v)
d e s c r i b e di ns t e p3 .
The following is a corollary of Lemma 6, which will be useful in the welfare analysis. It follows
immediately from step 3 of the proof.
Corollary 1 Let ζ be the function deﬁn e di nt h ep r o o fo fL e m m a6a n dl e tρCE be the equilibrium level
of ρ.T h e n ,ζ (ρ) > 0 for all ρ>ρ CE.
6.5 Proof of Proposition 2
Deﬁne the function G
G(y)=
½
F (y) if y ≥ 0
y if y<0 .





πs (A − b2s)k1s
subject to






πs (G(k0 − k1s) − G0 (k0 − k1s)(k0 − k1s)) ≥ 0, (λ)
G0 (k0 − k1s)(k0 − k1s)+( xs − b1s)k0 + b2sk1s ≥ 0, (πsµs)
0 ≤ b1s ≤ θas + G0 (k0 − k1s) − γ, (πsνs)
0 ≤ b2s ≤ θA,
k1s,k 0 ≥ 0.
In parentheses, I report the Lagrange multipliers corresponding to the ﬁrst three sets of constraints.
The multiplier νs refers to the inequality b1s ≤ θas+G0 (k0 − k1s)−γ. I will write G0∗




s for G00 (k∗
0 − k∗
1s). As in the case of the entrepreneur’s problem, the planner’s problem can be
stated in terms of the variables {b1s} and {b2s},e v e ni fk0 or {k1s} are zero (see the proof of Lemma
2). The rest of the proof is split in several steps.
30Step 1. I derive the Kuhn-Tucker necessary ﬁrst order conditions for an optimum. First, the




































s ≤ 0, (38)




0 < 0 then νs =0and b∗
1s =0 , (39a)
if πsλk∗
0 − πsµsk∗
0 =0 then νs =0and b∗
1s ∈ [0,θa s + G0∗
s − γ], (39b)
if πsλk∗
0 − πsµsk∗
0 > 0 then νs =( λ − µs)k∗
0 and b∗
1s = θas + G0∗
s − γ, (39c)
if πsµsk∗
1s − πsk∗
1s < 0 then b∗
2s =0 , (40a)
if πsµsk∗
1s − πsk∗
1s =0 then b∗
2s ∈ [0,θA], (40b)
if πsµsk∗
1s − πsk∗
1s > 0 then b∗
2s = θA. (40c)
Step 2. Using the conditions above I show that, at an optimum, µs > 1 and b∗
2s = θA for s = l,h,
q∗
l <q ∗
h =1 ,a n dk∗
0 > 0 and k∗
1s > 0 for s = l,h. First, notice that conditions (39a)-(39c) imply that
νs =( λ − µs)+ k∗
0. (41)
Lemma 3 and no-default in period 2 imply that G0∗
s −b∗


















Let me show that the expression (λ − µs)G00∗
s (k∗
0 − k∗
1s) − (λ − µs)+ G00∗
s k∗
0 is always non-negative. If
λ ≤ µs this expression is equal to (λ − µs)G00∗
s (k∗
0 − k∗
1s) ≥ 0, where the inequality follows because
either k∗
0 − k∗
1s > 0 and G00∗
s < 0 or k∗
0 − k∗
1s ≤ 0 and G00∗
s =0 .I f λ>µ s this expression is equal to
−(λ − µs)G00∗
s k∗








where the second inequality follows since A>1 ≥ G0∗
s . Condition (40c) then implies that b∗
2s = θA.









Proceeding as in the proof of Lemma 4, I can show that k∗
1h − k∗
0 > 0 and k∗
1l − k∗
0 < 0, implying
that q∗
h = G0∗
h =1 , q∗
l = G0∗
l < 1,a n dG00∗
h =0 . Moreover, I can show that k∗
0 and k∗
1s are positive.
First, notice that if k∗
0 =0then (43) implies that the entrepreneur’s utility is zero, contradicting the
assumption that it is positive. Second, k∗
0 > 0 and (43) imply that k∗
1s > 0.
Step 3. Next, I show that µs >λiﬀ z∗
1s >λ . This, together with conditions (39a)-(39c) gives
the characterization of {b∗
1s} in the proposition. Since k∗
1s > 0 (from step 2), (38) and (42) hold as
equalities. Suppose that λ ≤ µs. Then, given the deﬁnition of z∗












31Assumption C implies that G0∗
s − θA + G00∗
s (k∗
0 − k∗
1s) > 0. Therefore, µs − λ has the same sign as
z∗
1s − λ. Suppose, instead, that λ>µ s. Then, I obtain
(µs − λ)
G0∗







and, given that G00∗
s ≤ 0, µs − λ inherits the sign of z∗
1s − λ also in this case.
Step 4. Finally, I prove inequality (22). Since k∗
0 > 0 (from step 2) (37) must hold as an equality.



























Substituting (42) (as an equality), using q∗
s = G0∗
s , G00∗


















1l) − (λ − µl)+ G00
l k∗
0





In step 3 I have shown that (λ − µl)G00∗
l (k∗
0 − k∗
1l) − (λ − µl)+ G00
l k∗
0 ≥ 0, and it is easy to show that
the inequality is strict whenever λ 6= µl (notice that k∗
0 − k∗
1l < 0). Since xl + θA − b∗




1s > 0, it follows that λ<z ∗
0 except if λ = µl,i nw h i c hc a s eλ = z∗
0. This completes the
proof. ¥
6.6 Proof of Proposition 3
Before proving the proposition, it is useful to introduce the following lemma.
Lemma 7 Suppose the planner chooses ρ∗ >ρ CE and the associated price is q∗
l ,t h e nq∗
l ≤ Q(ρ∗)
(where the function Q is deﬁned in Lemma 5).





















˜ b1l =m i n
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=0 .D i ﬀerentiating
the function J and noticing that ∂˜ b1l/∂kT






















32Some algebra shows that η (as deﬁned in Assumption C’) is an upper bound for the expression in square
brackets on the right-hand side. Therefore, Assumption C’ is suﬃcient to ensure that J is monotone
increasing in kT
1l. Moreover, it is possible to show that the function J is monotone decreasing in b1l and




















=0 , the last inequality implies that kT∗
1l ≥ k
T,CE











1l, are increasing in kT



















− UCE ≥ 0. (46)








≥ 0.L e tˆ kT
1l denote the
value of kT







=0 ,w h e r eH is the function deﬁned in Lemma 5. Since H is
monotone in kT
1l it follows that ˆ kT
1l ≤ kT∗
1l , which implies that q∗






Now, I can turn to Proposition 3. I will proceed by contradiction, assume that ρ∗ >ρ CE,a n ds h o w
that this leads to a violation of the optimality conditions of the planner’s problem. Notice that when
¯ U = UCE, the entrepreneurs must achieve positive utility at the social optimum (since they do so at
the competitive equilibrium, and the competitive allocation is feasible). So Proposition 2 applies.
Step 1. I ﬁrst deﬁne the values ˆ z0 and ˆ z1s, which will be used below. Let ˆ qh and ˆ ql denote the







.T h a ti s ,ˆ qh =1and ˆ ql = Q(ρ∗),w h e r eQ(.) is the function deﬁned in Lemma 5. Let ˆ z0 and
ˆ z1s denote the values of z0 and z1s obtained substituting {b∗
1s} and {ˆ q1s} in (14) and (15). Notice that
substituting {b∗
1s} and {q∗
1s} in (14) and (15) gives z∗
0 and z∗
1s.
Step 2. I now derive some inequalities regarding ˆ z0 and ˆ z1s. It is possible to show that ρ∗ >
ρCE implies q∗
l ≤ ˆ ql. This follows from Lemma 7, and here is where Assumption C’ is used. This
result immediately implies that ˆ z1l ≤ z∗
1l. Moreover, q∗
h =ˆ qh =1implies that ˆ z1h = z∗
1h. Finally,
Iw a n tt os h o wt h a tˆ z0 ≥ z∗
0. To prove this inequality, it is suﬃcient to show that (15) deﬁnes an
increasing function in ql, which follows from diﬀerentiating (15) with respect to ql and using the fact
that xl + θA− b1l < 0.
Step 3. Deﬁne the state s0 as follows: s0 = h if 0 <ρ ∗ ≤ ˆ ρ and s0 = l if ρ∗ > ˆ ρ (ρ∗ =0is not
possible since ρ∗ >ρ CE ≥ 0 by hypothesis). The construction in step 1 implies that
ˆ z1s0 − ˆ z0 = ζ (ρ∗),
where ζ (.) is the function deﬁned in Lemma 6. Since ρ∗ >ρ CE, Corollary 1 implies that ζ (ρ∗) > 0.
Finally, Proposition 2 shows that λ
∗ ≤ z∗






0 ≥ ˆ z1s0 − ˆ z0 > 0.
Notice that the deﬁnition of the state s0 implies that b∗
1s0 > 0. The inequalities b∗
1s0 > 0 and z∗
1s0−λ
∗ > 0
violate the planner’s optimality conditions derived in 2. This completes the argument.
Finally, I turn to the last statement of the proposition. Suppose that the equilibrium is of type 1,






0 ≥ ˆ z1s0 − ˆ z0 ≥ 0,
where the ﬁrst inequality is now strict, because of Proposition 2. Again, I obtain a contradiction. ¥





























Moreover, Proposition 3 shows that ρ∗ ≤ ρCE. An argument symmetric to the one used in the previous
proof shows that ρ∗ ≤ ρCE implies that kT∗
1l ≤ k
T,CE



















− UCE ≤ 0. (48)
Putting together (47) and (48) gives the desired result.
6.7 Full commitment on the entrepreneurs’ side
Here, I discuss the equilibrium in the case where entrepreneurs have unlimited ability to commit future
repayments, i.e., when θ =1 .L e t m e d e r i v e ﬁrst the ﬁr s tb e s ta l l o c a t i o n ,n e x tIw i l ls h o wt h a tt h i s
allocation can be achieved in equilibrium without violating the consumers’ participation constraints.







k0 ≤ n + d0,
qsk1s ≤ (qs + xs)k0 − d1s for s = l,h,
ce
2s ≤ Ak1s − d2s for s = l,h,
and





e + d1s − kT






e − d0 ≥ 0,e + d1s − kT






with ¯ U =3 e. Note that in this case it is necessary to take into account the non-negativity constraints
for the consumers’ consumption levels. It is possible to show that the optimum is achieved when
d0 = e, d1s = −e, d2s =2 e,
ce
2s = A(1 + xs)(n + e)+Ae − 2e,
k0 = n + e, k1s =( 1+xs)(n + e)+e, kT
1s =0 .
The same allocation is achieved in a competitive equilibrium with prices qh = ql =1 .G i v e nt h a t
these prices are constant at 1 in a neighborhood of the planner’s optimum, it is easy to show that
the ﬁrst-order conditions of the individual problem are satisﬁed at the planner’s optimum. Moreover,
absent the no-default conditions of the entrepreneur, the individual problem is concave so the planner’s
optimum is also an individual optimum.
6.8 Proof of Proposition 4
The entrepreneur’s problem is now to maximize
X
s
πs (A − b2s)k1s,
34subject to
k0 ≤ νn (49)




qsk1s ≤ (qs + xs − b1s)k0 + b2sk1s for s = l,h,
0 ≤ b1s ≤ θas + qs − γ for s = l,h,
0 ≤ b2s ≤ θA for s = l,h.









where ξ is the Lagrange multiplier on (49). Take a constrained eﬃcient allocation, characterized in 2,
set ν = n/k∗
0 and









1s)) − ¯ U.
To show that {b∗
1s} solves the entrepreneur’s optimization substitute in the entrepreneur’s ﬁrst order
conditions, setting z0 = λ
∗ and ξ equal to the right-hand side of (44). ¥
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